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I. INTRODUCTION
eSnowshoes, Inc. is a hypothetical small company selling snowshoes online. To finance its business, eSnowshoes borrowed $100,000
from Commercial Bank and granted the bank a security interest in
its inventory, accounts receivable, and general intangibles, including
the www.snowshoes.com domain name that it registered with Network Solutions and the eSnowshoes storefront in the virtual world
Second Life.1 Commercial Bank properly perfected the security interest by filing a financing statement. Because of unusually warm winters in the northeastern United States, eSnowshoes’ biggest market,
snowshoes started to fall out of favor, and eSnowshoes defaulted on
the loan. Commercial Bank knows that it can use self-help repossession to obtain the inventory and self-help collection remedies to obtain payment on the accounts receivable, but it wants to know how to
enforce its interest in the Internet domain name and the Second Life
virtual “real estate.”
The methods of enforcing a security interest against tangible
goods2 and intangible payment rights3 are clear under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and to a lesser extent under

∗ Professor, Widener University School of Law. Many thanks to my research assistant, Keely Espinar, Widener University School of Law, Class of 2008, and to Widener University School of Law for its generous research support. I received helpful guidance at a
very early stage of this project from the participants in a faculty workshop at the University of Maryland School of Law. Bill Reynolds gave many helpful comments on drafts of
this Article.
1. Second Life, http://www.secondlife.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
2. U.C.C. § 9-609(a)(1) (2005) (“after default, a secured party may take possession of
the collateral”).
3. Id. § 9-607(a) (“[A]fter default, a secured party may notify an account debtor or
other person obligated on collateral to make payment or otherwise render performance to
or for the benefit of the secured party.”). This section must be read with § 9-406, which outlines the rights and obligations of persons obligated on payment rights.
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other state laws governing creditors’ rights.4 A creditor’s ability to
enforce a security interest against other electronic assets, however, is
far less certain. One reason for this lack of certainty is the adherence
of commercial law to the notion of tangibility. Classifying property
according to its tangibility or intangibility creates false categories
unrelated to significant legal distinctions, and these false categories
hinder the ability of commercial law to expand to adequately accommodate electronic assets. In this Article, I will demonstrate that the
category of “tangible” is irrelevant in property law and argue that
commercial law must discard distinctions based on the physical
manifestation of assets and focus instead on the legal qualities of
those assets. Such a shift in focus will allow commercial law to more
readily adapt to the proliferation of emerging electronic assets that
do not fit into established categories of intangible rights such as intellectual property and payment rights.
In Part II of this Article, I will illustrate the dichotomous treatment of tangible and intangible rights under Article 9 of the U.C.C. I
will focus specifically on the default provisions of Article 9, which allow a creditor to repossess collateral upon its debtor’s default. The focus on creditors’ remedies will illustrate the importance that the
U.C.C. places on manual possession,5 a concept that has no relevance
when the collateral consists of electronic assets. I choose the area of
remedies because, while many have written on the role of possession
in the Article 9 perfection context,6 the role of possession in the
remedies context begs for analysis. Although the U.C.C. was drafted
to allow courts to adapt it to changing commercial conditions, in Part
III, I will discuss some reasons why courts may have trouble expanding the creditors’ remedies in Article 9 to emerging electronic assets.
In that Part, I will discuss several cases that illustrate the extent to
which intangible assets confound lawyers and judges. In Part IV, I go
back in time and discuss cases from the past two hundred years that
have successfully grappled with the concept of possession in fact scenarios in which manual possession was either impossible or impracticable.
My goal in this Article is to illustrate that the challenges posed by
electronic assets are not new and that by keeping traditional prop4. See infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
5. Others have focused on this issue over the years, usually when an article of the
Uniform Commercial Code was in the revision process. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder,
Some Realism About Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 455 (1996) (stating
that “[c]ommercial law is in the grasp of a physical metaphor”).
6. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An
Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175 (1983); Peter F. Coogan, Article
9—An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012 (1978); Schroeder, supra note 5;
Robert A. Zadek, The Uniform Commercial Code’s Misplaced Emphasis on Possession, 28
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 391 (1994).
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erty law principles in mind the institutions that make commercial
law will be better able to adapt that body of law to modern transactions. Almost fifty years ago, Grant Gilmore, the coreporter for Article 9, identified the challenges that intangible assets present to the
law of secured transactions and suggested ways in which courts
might conquer them.7 A half-century later, lawmaking bodies continue to struggle with these problems, which present themselves in
both property law generally and the more specific property laws related to creditors’ rights. By comparing today’s electronic assets to
yesterday’s novel assets, both tangible and intangible, I hope to integrate electronic assets into the larger category of property and
thereby suggest a coherent approach to creditors’ rights in electronic
assets.
A coherent theory of electronic assets is necessary to the development of the laws governing the transfer and financing of these assets. The need for such a theory can be illustrated by comparing the
development of the law of electronic contracting with the treatment
of electronic assets in our creditors’ rights laws. Courts have been
grappling with electronic contracting issues since 1999, when the
court in Caspi v. Microsoft8 held that a person who clicked an “I
agree” icon assented to online terms.9 Courts opining on the enforceability of electronic contracts are guided by two statutes: the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act10 and the Electronic Signatures in National and Global Commerce Act,11 both of which instruct courts that
a contract cannot be denied enforceability solely because it is in electronic form or signed electronically. While some courts may have interpreted this mandate too broadly, ignoring important differences
between paper and electronic communications,12 the statutes provide
courts with a framework within which to analyze contract terms presented electronically. The electronic contracting statutes instruct
courts to look beyond form and consider, regardless of the physical
manifestation of the terms, whether contract rules such as those governing offer and acceptance are satisfied. Because there is no statute
that tells courts that the physical manifestation of an asset should be
ignored or given little weight by courts in deciding when rights in an
asset have been transferred, I hope in this Article to urge the recognition of a general property law framework that discards tangibility
qua tangibility as a relevant category.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
Id. at 530-33.
UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT §7, 7A U.L.A. 211 (2002).
15 U.S.C. § 7001 (2000).
See generally Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57
RUTGERS L. REV. 1307 (2005).
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II. TANGIBILITY AND THE U.C.C.
A. Generally
Article 1 of the U.C.C. sets forth its purposes and policies. Included among these purposes and policies is the modernization of the
law governing commercial transactions and the “continued expansion
of commercial practices.”13 As I will illustrate in this section, the pervasive dichotomy in the U.C.C. between tangible and intangible
rights stifles this expansion.
The drafters of the U.C.C. never intended for it to cover all areas
of commercial law.14 For instance, real estate transactions are commonly considered to be commercial, but are expressly excluded from
the scope of the U.C.C.15 Even when the U.C.C. governs a transaction, it is silent on some aspects of that transaction. For example, Article 2 of the U.C.C. governs sales of goods, but the common law of
contracts governs most matters regarding the formation of a contract
for the sale of goods.16 By its terms, the U.C.C. yields to common law
principles,17 and it does not define such terms as property18 and possession.19 As a result, when novel issues arise in transactions covered
by the U.C.C., courts should fill the statutory gaps. Courts, by focusing on the intangibility of electronic assets and not on the relationships between the persons claiming rights in those assets and the assets themselves, are not adequately filling the gaps.
The U.C.C. generally is divided between the tangible and the intangible. Numerous examples of this dichotomy are found by examining the scope of the U.C.C. and how it covers different types of rights
within that scope. For instance, Article 2 governs the transfer of almost all tangible personal property,20 while Articles 3, 7, and 8 gov13. U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2005).
14. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 FLA. L.
REV. 367, 378 (1957) (“[c]ertain obviously vital fields of commerce are out . . . .”).
15. U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(11) (stating that Article 9 does not apply to “the creation or
transfer of an interest in or lien on real property”).
16. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3 (5th ed.
2000).
17. U.C.C. § 1-103(b) & cmt. 2.
18. See id. § 9-408 cmt. 3 (“Neither this section nor any other provision of this Article
determines whether a debtor has a property interest. . . . [o]ther law determines whether a
debtor has a property interest . . . and the nature of that interest.”); In re Chris-Don, Inc.,
367 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701 (D.N.J. 2005) (holding that because a New Jersey statute “emphatically defines [liquor] licenses as ‘not property,’ ” § 9-408, which invalidates certain restrictions on the transfer of general intangibles, does not apply to a New Jersey liquor license).
19. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 16, at § 22-8(b) (“The drafters of the UCC . . . declined the futile task of defining possession in the Code.”).
20. U.C.C. §§ 2-102 (2000) (“[T]his Article applies to transactions in goods . . . .”), 2105 (defining goods as “all things . . . which are movable at the time of identification to the
contract of sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities
. . . and things in action”). I refer here to the unamended version of Article 2 of the U.C.C.,
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ern the transfer of specific types of intangible property: negotiable
instruments,21 documents of title,22 and investment securities.23 The
types of property governed by Articles 3, 7, and 8 are rights that were
traditionally reified in paper. At the time that the U.C.C. was first
promulgated, the intangible rights governed by Articles 3, 7, and 8
were commonly transferred by the manual transfer of the paper embodying those rights; in modern times, the drafters of the U.C.C.
have recognized the fact that, at least in the businesses governed by
Articles 7 and 8, the manual transfer of paper is declining in significance.24
The articles of the U.C.C. that govern specific types of intangible
property developed to accommodate business practices in various industries. The U.C.C. does not govern the sale of intangibles generally,25 and attempts to develop a statute governing the transfer of
software have failed dismally.26
In one area of commercial law, distinctions based on the physical
manifestation of some assets once served a valuable business purpose. The law of negotiable instruments illustrates how possession
and tangibility were once necessary to facilitate commerce. The requisites of negotiability were developed during the Industrial Revolution, a period in which cash was in short supply.27 The banking system at the time could not accommodate the expansion of commercial
activity so the merchants responded by developing their own version
of paper currency, the bill of exchange.28 These negotiable instru-

which, at the time of this writing, is the law in all of the states that have enacted Article 2
of the U.C.C.
21. U.C.C. § 3-102 (2005).
22. Id. § 7-101.
23. Id. § 8-101.
24.UNIF. LAW COMM’RS, SUMMARY, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE—REVISED ARTICLE 7
(2003)
[hereinafter
REVISED
ARTICLE
7
SUMMARY],
available
at
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_summaries/uniformacts-s-ucc7.asp; U.C.C. Article 8 prefatory note.
25. The previous version of Article 1 of the U.C.C. contained a statute of frauds provision that applied to the sale of personal property not otherwise covered by the U.C.C.
U.C.C. § 1-206 (2000). According to the Official Comment, that statute of frauds was applicable to sales of general intangibles. Revised Article 1 does not contain such a statute of
frauds, and it has an explicit scope provision that states that Article 1 applies to a transaction “to the extent that it is governed by another article of” the U.C.C. U.C.C. § 1-102
(2005).
26. The story of the failed attempt to develop a uniform law of software contracts has
been told many times. See, e.g., Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA on the Road: What Lessons
Have We Learned?, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 167 (2001); Maureen A. O’Rourke, An Essay
on the Challenges of Drafting a Uniform Law of Software Contracting, 10 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 925 (2006); Nim Razook, The Promise and Politics of UCITA, 36 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 643 (2003).
27. Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13
CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 446-47 (1979).
28. Id. at 447.

124

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:119

ments were in fact passed from person to person in payment of
debts.29 The formal requirements of negotiability developed not only
to facilitate physical transfer, but also to facilitate valuation. The
terms of the contract had to be certain so that potential buyers could
evaluate the worth of the contract.30 These principles are codified in
Article 3 of the U.C.C.
While the legal distinctions based on the tangible or intangible
nature of payment rights survive, they have been under fire for decades. Grant Gilmore described Article 3 of the U.C.C. as a “museum
of antiquities.”31 In the 1970s, the Permanent Editorial Board for the
U.C.C. established a committee to explore the feasibility of a “New
Payments Code” that would establish rules for payment rights organized on functional, rather than formal, lines.32 While this approach
was never codified, payments scholars continue to explain the irrelevance of the tangible form to the function of the system, with one
scholar urging that the law focus not on outdated concepts of negotiability in payment systems, but rather on the common functions of
all payment systems, paper and electronic.33
Today, tangibility plays a declining role in other areas of commercial law. In the past fifteen years, several U.C.C. articles have been
revised successfully. One theme that ties these revisions together is
the facilitation of electronic transactions. Article 1 (General Provisions), revised in 2001, aims to accommodate electronic contracts
generally in several of its new definitions.34 Article 7 (Documents of
Title), revised in 2003, now recognizes that rights in goods in storage
or transit can now be transferred either by the manual transfer of a
tangible document of title or by a transfer in control of an electronic
document of title.35 Articles 7 and 9 of the U.C.C. now provide for

29. Id. at 447-48.
30. See generally FRED H. MILLER & ALVIN C. HARRELL, THE LAW OF MODERN
PAYMENT SYSTEMS ¶ 2.01(1) (2003); Gilmore, supra note 27, at 447-48.
31. Gilmore, supra note 27, at 461. Gilmore characterized one function of codification
as “to preserve the past, like a fly in amber.” Id.
32. See generally Fred H. Miller, A Report on the New Payments Code, 29 BUS. LAW.
1215 (1984).
33. See generally Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit
Systems, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 951 (1997).
34. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201(a)(10) (2005) (defining “conspicuous” in a manner that
accommodates both paper and electronic records), 1-201(a)(31) (defining “record” to mean
“information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or
other medium”), 1-201(a)(36) (defining “send” in a manner that accommodates both paper
and electronic communications).
35. REVISED ARTICLE 7 SUMMARY, supra note 24.
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electronic documents of title36 and electronic chattel paper,37 respectively, although the U.C.C. provisions governing the transfer of those
electronic assets appear tied to concepts of negotiability that become
irrelevant when the rights in question are electronic.38
Article 8 (Investment Securities), last revised in 1994, is an example of a U.C.C. article in which physical possession and manual
transfer were once key. Over the years, Article 8 has evolved to recognize that the covered business, securities holding, will likely
change form over the life of the statute.39 Article 8 of the U.C.C. rejects the paradigm securities transaction that relies on the physical
transfer of a certificated security. This rejection was necessary because the securities business had ended its reliance on physical
transfer.40
These U.C.C. revisions illustrate that distinctions based on the
physical manifestation of assets, while once commercially important,
are becoming irrelevant. As I will discuss below, that view is only
partially reflected in the current version of Article 9.
B. Tangibility and Article 9
Article 9 of the U.C.C. was also revised recently, but its provisions
do not adequately govern security interests in intangible rights. Although Article 9 purports to cover all types of personal property
rights, both tangible and intangible, and includes as a category of collateral “general intangibles,”41 in many ways it best illustrates the
problem of the U.C.C.’s distinction between tangible and intangible
property rights. Although a debtor can grant a security interest under Article 9 in all sorts of personal property rights, and the creditor
can perfect an interest in tangible and intangible rights by filing a financing statement,42 Article 9 handles enforcement of those security
interests in intangible property on an asset-by-asset basis. This is a
problem that I have identified in earlier articles focused on Internet
36. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(a)(16) (including electronic documents of title in the definition of
“document of title”), 7-501(b) (explaining the process for negotiating an electronic document of title).
37. Id. §§ 9-102(a)(31) (defining electronic chattel paper), § 9-105 (setting forth rules
for control of chattel paper).
38. Mann, supra note 33, at 962.
39. U.C.C. Article 8 prefatory note; see also Russell A. Hakes, U.C.C. Article 8: Will
the Indirect Holding of Securities Survive the Light of Day?, 35 LOU. L.A. L. REV. 661, 665
(2002).
40. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and
Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled By Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305,
307-30 (1990); James Steven Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1431, 1441-47 (1996).
41. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (defining “general intangible” as all personal property that
does not fit within the enumerated categories of collateral in Article 9).
42. Id. §§ 9-310, 9-312.
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domain names43 and is a problem that is exacerbated by the tendency
of those involved in lawmaking to focus on tangible property as the
property prototype.
The history of Article 9 shows a gradual decrease in the importance of tangibility and manual possession. As business grew and secured transactions became more sophisticated, the laws governing
secured transactions placed a decreasing amount of weight on manual possession by a secured creditor as a method of perfecting a security interest. One hundred and fifty years before the original U.C.C.
was promulgated, physical pledge was the only method of perfecting
a security interest in personal property.44 Various types of nonpossessory security interests, perfected by filing, developed with the increased demand for credit secured by inventory and receivables. As
Karl Llewellyn described Article 9, it was designed to “bring[ ] into
simplified and workable form the law of all chattel security, whether
the asset be tangible, or be a single contract or accounts receivable
transferred at wholesale or other intangibles.”45
Until its most recent revision, Article 9 provided for perfection by
both pledge and filing but retained the mandatory pledge for certain
types of property, such as negotiable instruments.46 The physical
transfer of paper remains crucial in the law of negotiable instruments and prerevised Article 9 recognized that. The most recent iteration of Article 9 even further reduces the significance of possession by allowing perfection of security interests in instruments and
chattel paper by filing, while continuing to give higher priority to
perfection by pledge.47
In its default provisions, however, Article 9 starts from the baseline idea that all collateral is tangible and that a creditor can take
physical possession of such collateral upon its debtor’s default and
sell the collateral to satisfy the debt owed.48 Interestingly, nothing in
the plain language of Article 9 limits the repossession remedy to
goods and other tangible assets. As noted above, the U.C.C. does not
define possession. Commentators, however, including the authors of
some of the leading casebooks and treatises in the field, contend that

43. Juliet M. Moringiello, Grasping Intangibles: Domain Names and Creditors’
Rights, 8 J. OF INTERNET L. 3 (2004); Juliet M. Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names to Enforce Judgments: Looking Back to Look to the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 95 (2003) [hereinafter Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names].
44. Coogan, supra note 6, at 1014 .
45. Llewellyn, supra note 14, at 379 (emphasis added).
46. G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 3, 34 (2001).
47. U.C.C. §§ 9-312(a), 9-330(b), (d) (2005).
48. Id. § 9-609(a).

2007]

FALSE CATEGORIES IN COMMERCIAL LAW

127

the repossession remedy is limited to tangible property.49 Therefore,
in the hypothetical transaction described in the Introduction to this
Article, Commercial Bank knows that it can repossess the inventory
using the self-help remedy so long as it does not breach the peace.50 It
is unlikely that Commercial Bank would be able to repossess inventory from the debtor’s warehouse without breaching the peace, but it
can resort to replevin, one of the old common-law writs that allows a
creditor to obtain possession of tangible personal property.51 Therefore, whether Commercial Bank proceeds by self-help under Article 9
or by replevin under the applicable state’s non-U.C.C. law, it knows
how to foreclose on its tangible collateral, the inventory.
Commercial Bank also has a relatively easy way to collect the accounts receivable granted as collateral. The U.C.C. allows a secured
creditor, after a default on the part of its debtor, to “notify an account
debtor or other person obligated on collateral” to pay to the secured
creditor the money that it would otherwise have paid to the debtor.52
The definition of “account debtor” includes a person obligated on an
account receivable,53 so Commercial Bank need only send notice to
the parties that owe eSnowshoes money for snowshoes. After those
persons receive the notice from Commercial Bank, they can discharge
their obligations to eSnowshoes only by paying Commercial Bank.54
Article 9 protects these account debtors by giving them the right to
ask the secured creditor, in this case Commercial Bank, for proof
that the accounts have been assigned to the creditor.55 After Commercial Bank furnishes such proof, the account debtors must pay
Commercial Bank or risk having to pay twice.56
Article 9 provides no foreclosure remedy to a creditor holding a security interest in intangible property that is not a payment right, or
a “true” general intangible. Because the definition of “account debtor”
includes not only persons obligated on accounts receivable or chattel
49. LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
43 (5th ed. 2006); LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON
SECURED TRANSACTIONS 135 (2006); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 16 at § 25-4 (“[The secured creditor] can repossess the goods subject to the security interest . . . .”); TIMOTHY R.
ZINNECKER, THE DEFAULT PROVISIONS OF REVISED ARTICLE 9, at 21 (1999) (discussing general intangibles as the type of collateral for which “collection” under § 9-607 is the appropriate remedy). As I will explain below, § 9-607 does not adequately protect creditors with
a security interest in general intangibles. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
50. U.C.C. § 9-609.
51. Id. § 9-609(b)(1); 1 WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS § 6:32 (rev. ed. 2005); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 16, at § 25-8.
52. U.C.C. § 9-607(a)(1).
53. Id. § 9-102(a)(3).
54. Id. § 9-406.
55. Id. § 9-406(c).
56. Id § 9-406(a) (explaining that an account debtor can discharge its obligation by
paying the assignor only until it receives notification that payment is to be made to the assignee).
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paper but also any person obligated on a general intangible,57 the collection remedy appears at first to extend to all types of intangible collateral, not just payment rights. The U.C.C. protects only the account
debtor obligated on an account, chattel paper, or a payment intangible, however, because only those account debtors may discharge their
obligations by rendering performance to the secured party.58
As a result, Commercial Bank will not find any remedies against
the Internet domain name and the Second Life assets in the U.C.C.
Assuming that the rights to the domain name and virtual “real estate” are considered the debtor’s property, an assumption that I will
address in the next Part of this Article, eSnowshoes will be able to
grant a security interest in them. Under Article 9, one of the requisites for creation of a security interest is that the debtor must have
“rights in the collateral.”59 Collateral is defined in property terms, as
“the property subject to a security interest.”60 Both the domain name
and the Second Life assets would be included in the definition of
“general intangibles,”61 one of the collateral categories under Article
9. A secured party must perfect its security interest in general intangibles by filing a financing statement.62 As explained above, however,
Article 9 does not explicitly provide for any remedy against intangible rights that are not payment rights.
The absence of a foreclosure remedy under Article 9 does not necessarily deprive Commercial Bank of a remedy. Under Article 9, a secured party may enforce its interest by “any available judicial procedure.”63 These judicial procedures also developed along lines based on
the tangibility or intangibility of the assets involved, and they vary
greatly from state to state. Replevin, as noted above, allows a secured
creditor to gain possession only of tangible personal property.64 Article 9 also allows a secured creditor to resort to the judicial remedies
available to unsecured creditors, such as execution and garnishment,
but these remedies likewise may not allow the secured creditor to
gain control over intangible rights that are not payment rights.65
Creditors in every state can force the seizure and sale of a debtor’s
57. Id. § 9-102(a)(3).
58. Id. § 9-406. Article 9 also allows creditors to collect deposit accounts, which can
also be characterized as payment rights. Id. § 9-607.
59. Id. § 9-203(b)(2).
60. Id. § 9-102(a)(12).
61. Id. § 9-102(a)(42).
62. Id. § 9-310(a).
63. Id, § 9-601(a)(1).
64. 1 BROWN, supra note 51, § 6.32, at 6-82 (“[T]he property must be tangible and specifically identifiable.”).
65. Id. § 6.52, at 6-139 (“It has been said that intangible personal property is not subject to execution; however, it seems that intangible property is not subject to execution because it most often is a debt due the judgment debtor, in which case, garnishment must be
used.” (footnote omitted)); Moringiello, supra note 43, at 131-32.
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tangible property through the execution process, but there is no universally available mechanism by which to gain control over intangible property.
Generally, garnishment—the process by which the creditor brings
an action to force a third party holding an asset of the debtor to turn
that asset over to the creditor—is available to a creditor seeking to
enforce rights in property of its debtor that is held by a third party.66
Some garnishment statutes appear to enable the creditor to reach
any property, tangible or intangible;67 others, however, narrowly define the categories of garnishable property.68
Many have criticized the morass of state laws governing collection
of judgments. These judicial remedies are based on ancient writs,69
and while some states have modernized their creditors’ rights laws to
simplify the process of obtaining assets to satisfy a judgment, the
process of enforcing a security interest against intangible assets is
far from uniform. Fifty years ago, Stefan Riesenfeld described the
field as possessing “hopeless prolixity and diversification” and placed
the blame for such deficiencies on “the unhappy tendency of American jurisdictions . . . to cling with amazing tenacity to outmoded preconceptions and traditions of the common law.”70 Riesenfeld was not
alone. Others have described in detail the inadequacies of the laws
governing enforcement of judgments.71 It is not the goal of this Article to repeat those criticisms, but it is useful to compare two statutes
in effect today, those of Illinois and Massachusetts, to illustrate some
of the difficulties facing a secured creditor searching for a remedy
against a general intangible. In Illinois, a creditor is entitled to institute a garnishment proceeding against anyone who is either indebted
to or holds “other property” of its debtor.72 In Massachusetts, however, a creditor can bring a garnishment action only against one who
holds “goods, effects, or credits” of the debtor.73 In 1946, a court interpreting the Massachusetts statute held that the use of the words
66. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 61-62 (5th. ed. 2006).
67. See, e.g., PA. R. CIV. P. § 3101 (Supp. 2006) (allowing a garnishment action against
anyone who has “custody, possession or control” of the debtor’s property).
68. See, e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-511 (2001) (allowing only a “liability” to be garnished).
69. See generally Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American
Law—A Historical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IOWA L. REV. 155 (1957).
70. Id. at 155.
71. Lorin Brennan, Financing Intellectual Property Under Federal Law: A National
Imperative, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 195, 247-72 (2001); Doreen J. Gridley, The
Immunity of Intangible Assets from a Writ of Execution: Must We Forgive Our Debtors?, 28
IND. L. J. 755 (1995); Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names, supra note 43, at 129-37; William J. Woodward, New Judgment Liens on Personal Property: Does “Efficient” Mean “Better?”, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1990).
72. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-701 (2005).
73. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 246, § 20 (2004).
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“goods” and “effects” require “actual possession” by the third party.74
While it is possible that a court today would interpret a statute such
as this to cover intangible assets, in the next section of this Article, I
will demonstrate that today’s courts cling to notions of tangibility
that may never have been relevant.
Some states have attempted to alleviate some of the confusion by
adopting turnover statutes that specifically allow creditors to gain
control of intangible assets to satisfy their claims. For instance, in
California, a creditor may obtain a turnover order under which the
court can order all interests in the debtor’s property, either under the
debtor’s control or under the control of a third person, to be applied
toward the satisfaction of a money judgment.75 Rhode Island’s turnover statute authorizes a judgment creditor to reach “any equitable
estate, any equitable assets, or any choses in action” of a debtor,76
and courts recognize that this statute facilitates the seizure of intangibles. In Howe v. Richardson, the First Circuit, applying the Rhode
Island turnover statute, discussed the history of the turnover statute,
explaining that while the Rhode Island statutes governing creditors’
remedies are “a tangle of provisions cobbled together over time . . .
there is no general statutory bar to the seizure of intangibles.”77
Texas law also provides a clear method by which a judgment creditor
can reach assets not covered by the traditional writs; the Texas statute gives a judgment creditor the aid of the court to reach property of
the judgment debtor that “cannot readily be attached or levied on by
ordinary legal process . . . and . . . is not exempt from attachment,
execution, or seizure for the satisfaction of liabilities.”78
The distinctions that Article 9 draws based on the physical qualities of assets make no sense today and contradict both the original
intent of the U.C.C.’s drafters and the stated policies of the U.C.C.
Several scholars have explained that the transfer of physical possession is an anachronism that is irrelevant in today’s economy. This
charge has been leveled at the law of payment systems79 and the law

74. Jordan v. Lavin, 66 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Mass. 1946).
75. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 708.205 (West 1987). In California, courts recognize that
all property of a debtor, both tangible and intangible, is subject to enforcement of a money
judgment. See Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31939, at
*10 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[A]ll property . . . is subject to enforcement of a money judgment, including intangible property such as patents and copyrights.”); Imperial Bank v. Pim Elec.,
Inc., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 432, 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“[C]ommentators have remarked upon
the breadth of property reached by such order as one of its attributes.”).
76. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-28-1 (2001).
77. Howe v. Richardson, 193 F.3d 60, 62 (1st Cir. 1999).
78. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
79. Mann, supra note 33, at 953 (1997) (describing negotiability as “an outmoded and
decaying relic”).
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of investment securities.80 Some authors have also criticized the fact
that Article 9 allows a creditor to perfect its interest by possession,
noting that possession does not necessarily give notice to the relevant
players of the creditor’s security interest.81
The continued adherence to the concept of tangibility in Article 9’s
remedies provisions is counter to the intent of the original U.C.C.
drafters, as well as to the purposes and policies of the code. The absence of clear remedies for creditors with security interests in electronic assets renders the U.C.C. nonuniform, as the secured creditor
must look to other state laws, which are far from uniform, for its
remedies. As a result, the remedies provisions deviate from the
U.C.C.’s purposes of simplifying, modernizing and clarifying the law
governing commercial transactions and making “uniform the law
among the various jurisdictions.”82 Before the U.C.C. was enacted in
any state, the Code’s Chief Reporter, Karl Llewellyn, justified the
U.C.C. by describing commercial law in the 1950s as “extremely scattered” and “costly in time to the lawyer and therefore costly in money
to the business man.”83 As illustrated in this Section, the same might
be said in describing a secured creditor’s ability to enforce its interest
in intangible assets.84 Likewise, Grant Gilmore, another father of the
U.C.C., explained that one of the tasks of Article 9’s drafters was “to
simplify the legal framework so that businessmen and bankers could
go on doing what they were already doing to everyone’s satisfaction.”85 Forty years ago, Gilmore recognized some of the problems inherent in dealing with intangible assets and noted that while the
drafters could have made specific provisions for all of the known intangible assets at the time, they chose not to in the interest of drafting a code that would solve the problems of that time and the problems of the future.86
The approach of the U.C.C.’s drafters—to allow courts to interpret
the code language in light of changes in business practice—remains
relevant today, even as new electronic assets are created. This approach is echoed by many cyberspace law scholars who have criticized the way in which Congress and state legislatures have re80. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of
Secured Lending on Wall Street, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 291, 303 (describing Amended
Article 8 as a disaster in part because it “implicitly presumes that the paradigm of property interests in personalty is the actual sensuous grasp of a physical object in one’s
hand”).
81. Zadek, supra note 6, at 399.
82. U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2005).
83. Karl N. Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 779 (1953).
84. But neither I nor any other modern writer would limit the pool of aggrieved parties to “business men.”
85. Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does Not Do for the Future, 26 LA. L. REV. 300,
300 (1966).
86. Id. at 300-01.
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sponded to some of the challenges presented by the Internet. Part of
the criticism is that the common law is better able than legislation to
adapt to changing conditions.87 In an early cyberspace article, Professor Lawrence Lessig suggested that the common law process was the
best way “to let the experience catch up with the technology . . . give
the ordinary language a chance to evolve, and . . . encourage new
languages where the old gives out.”88 This approach has a long history in commercial law, as the original drafters of the U.C.C. wanted
not to emulate civil law jurisdictions by drafting a code designed to
be an exclusive statement of law, but to draft a code clear enough to
facilitate known transactions and flexible enough to allow judicial
decisions to fill the statutory gaps.89 In the cyberspace era, however,
courts are doing a poor job of adapting the commercial law of property to changing conditions, as I explain below. While it would have
been imprudent for the U.C.C. drafting committees of the past fifteen
years to enumerate electronic assets with specificity, the courts left
with the task of fashioning rules governing both rightful and wrongful transfers of electronic property are doing a poor job of providing
guidance to courts deciding commercial disputes.
III. THE LANGUAGE OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS
A. Giving the Property Label to Intangible Assets
Even for a lawyer, the “what is property?” problem presents no difficulty when you are dealing with goods, chattels, things: if you can
see it, count, weigh and measure it, it exists; if you can’t, it doesn’t.
But intangible claims are another matter entirely.90

Grant Gilmore wrote these words more than forty years ago, in
explaining that while Article 9 allows anything that is property to
serve as collateral, it does not define “property.” He recognized that
perhaps the question “what is property?” was the wrong question and
wondered whether we should instead ask “what types of claims or
choses in action . . . can be presently transferred . . . with the result
that today’s assignee will have priority over interests that attach to
the fund after it has indisputably come into existence?”91 For the
purpose of creditors’ rights laws, this inquiry remains current; if a
right can be transferred for value (or in exchange for a “fund”), then
it should be capable of serving as collateral. Gilmore’s writings show
a good deal of concern about the classification of intangibles in Arti87. Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 317 (2002).
88. Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744 (1995).
89. 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, at vii-ix (1965).
90. Gilmore, supra note 85, at 301.
91. Id.
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cle 9, and in several of his works he criticizes as overly complex the
separation of “pure” intangibles into contract rights, accounts, and
general intangibles.92 It remains necessary to give those rights a
property label because Article 9 defines collateral in property terms.93
As a result, it is almost impossible today to discuss intangible assets
such as domain names and items created in virtual worlds without
first confronting the question of whether such rights constitute
“property.”
Despite the fact that the way persons communicate and do business has changed dramatically in the past fifteen years, we still lack
an adequate vocabulary with which to describe intangible assets.
With changes in business inevitably come changes in property rights
and the business changes that developed with the growth of the
Internet have similarly created a demand for new property rights.94
Before the advent of the World Wide Web, the term “Internet domain
name” did not exist. Today, such names sell for millions of dollars.95
Likewise, in the burgeoning virtual worlds such as Second Life, participants buy and sell thousands of dollars worth of virtual cash and
other items every day.96 Although there are markets for these assets,
their intangibility causes people to question whether these assets are
“property” at all.97

92. 1 GILMORE, supra note 89, § 12.5, at 380-83; Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does
for the Past, 26 LA. L. REV. 285, 295 (1966); Grant Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism and
Article 9, 47 NEB. L. REV. 659, 674 (1968). The category of “contract rights” no longer exists
in Article 9.
93. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
94. See generally DEBORA L. SPAR, RULING THE WAVES: CYCLES OF DISCOVERY, CHAOS,
AND WEALTH FROM THE COMPASS TO THE INTERNET (2001).
95. For instance, the Wall Street Journal reported that the domain name “sex.com”
sold for about $12 million in early 2006 and that “diamond.com” sold for $7.5 million.
Kevin J. Delaney, Web Domain in Really Hot Locale: Hell.com Takes Bids, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 26, 2006, at B2. Auction sites such as GreatDomains.com list generic domain names
for sale. According to that site, the most valuable ones include “shrimp.com” (listed for
$3,000,000), “hikers.com” (listed for $850,000), and “tell.com” (listed for $500,000). See
GreatDomains, http://www.greatdomains.com/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
96. Second
Life
reports
its
in-world
economic
statistics
at
http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy_stats.php. Also, a search for “Second Life” in the
Internet Games pages on eBay gives some idea of the “real world” trade in virtual world
money and other items. Ebay, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
97. See, e.g., Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560-61 (E.D. Va. 1999) (questioning
whether an Internet domain name should be considered personal property subject to
judgment liens and concluding that “a domain name that is not a trademark arguably entails only contract, not property rights”); Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529
S.E.2d 80, 87 (Va. 2000) (concluding that an Internet domain name is the product of a contract for services); Complaint at 5-6, Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593
(E.D.
Pa.
2007)
(Case
No.
06-08711),
available
at
http://lawyers.com/BraggvLinden_Complaint.pdf (alleging that the operators of some virtual worlds
deny participants property rights in their creations, despite the active trade in virtual
world items).
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Of course, the question of whether a thing is “property” is somewhat miscast. The question of property is a question about relationships; therefore, it is more appropriate to ask whether the person
who wants protection of his or her rights in a resource or asset has
rights in that resource or asset that are superior to the rights of others. As Gilmore noted forty years ago, however, in asking property
questions, we commonly conflate rights in things with the things
themselves.98 We continue to do so, despite the widely accepted definition of “property” as the “relations among people with regard to
things.”99 The use of the word “thing” in this definition may improperly imply that the term property refers to rights in tangible items.
Joseph Singer recognizes this in his slightly amended definition of
property as the relations among people with respect to resources.100
Today, the rules governing the relationships among people with
respect to electronic assets are developing. This development is a
natural consequence of the technological changes wrought by the
Internet. As Debora Spar illustrates in her book, Ruling the Waves:
Cycles of Discovery, Chaos, and Wealth from the Compass to the
Internet, the innovators who initially eschew any interference from
the state eventually return to the state for the protection of their new
property rights.101
Many commentators writing in intellectual property and cyberspace law have also observed that we discuss property as though the
term refers to a thing rather than a relationship. For instance,
Stephen Carter, writing about intellectual property, stressed that
“property” is just a legal conclusion, notwithstanding our “conversational habit . . . to talk about an owner of a resource as though the
term [has] a legal significance.”102 Michael Madison, in advocating for
an “all-purpose theory of things,”103 concludes that abandoning our
conversational habit, or our “thing-based descriptions” in favor of descriptions based on rules and rights, leaves us “without a vocabulary
adequate to capture actual human experience.”104 Dan Hunter explains that observations from cognitive science investigations support the contention that we think of cyberspace as a place,105 and that

98. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 2 (2d ed. 2005).
100. Id. Singer notes that because “things” include the intangible, it is preferable to define property as the relations among people with respect to valuable resources. Id.
101. SPAR, supra note 94, at 21.
102. Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715, 716 (1993).
103. Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts and Digital Things, 56
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 382 (2005).
104. Id. at 478.
105. Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 439, 443 (2003).
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this process of “mapping the physical onto the virtual” pervades academic discussions and lawmaking processes.106
This Article is not about whether electronic assets such as Internet domain names and electronic creations in virtual worlds should
be protected as property and it is not about how these new rights
should be distributed. A number of authors have already addressed
those questions.107 As I will illustrate in this Part, however, our lack
of an adequate language with which to describe intangible assets can
cause courts, in what should be routine commercial law matters, to
delve into the question of whether an intangible asset is property or
something else. Routine problems should not be rethought constantly; otherwise, the efficiency that comes with their being routine
is lost.
In Part II of this Article, I explained that eSnowshoes can grant a
security interest in its Internet domain name and its Second Life assets if those rights are considered property of eSnowshoes. The question of whether rights in an asset are property rights is not often
asked when the asset is tangible. When intangible assets are at issue, however, people have difficulty extricating the intangible asset
from the contract that conveyed the property right in that asset. Participants in virtual worlds who develop their spaces in those worlds
stand to forfeit their work if they do not comply with the terms of
service governing those worlds. For example, while the Second Life
Terms of Service108 and representations on the Second Life web site109
indicate that participants in Second Life have property rights in
their virtual world assets, the Terms of Service also provide that the
participant’s account can be terminated and its assets forfeited if the
participant violates the Terms of Service.110 As a result, a court would
106. Id. at 474.
107. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2170
(2004) (arguing that “property-rule protection for network resources is more appropriate
than scholars have thus far recognized”); Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81
TEX. L. REV. 715, 720 (2003) (arguing that “[b]y rewarding domain names to those technologically adept and wealthy enough to grab available domain names on a first-come, firstserved basis, our current system replicates real-world inequalities in cyberspace”); Joshua
A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (2005) (arguing that “computer
code that is designed to act like real world property [should] be regulated and protected
like real world property”).
108. Second Life Terms of Service § 3.2 grants members copyright and other intellectual property rights to content that they create. See Second Life, Terms of Service,
http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
109. According to the Second Life web site, “[o]wning land allows you to control land.
You can prevent others from visiting or building there, change the shape of the land, subdivide and sell it, and much more.” See Second Life, Land: How To,
http://secondlife.com/community/land-howto.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
110. The Terms of Service deny members any rights to data stored on the Second Life
servers, including data created by the member. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note
108, at § 3.3. In addition, the Terms of Service allow Linden Labs, the operator of Second
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likely question the ability of eSnowshoes to grant a security interest
in its Second Life assets.111
On the other hand, real property law gives a seller of land several
methods by which to control the use of the land that she sells. For instance, a seller might restrict the use and enjoyment of the land by
inserting a covenant into the deed.112 The remedy for breach of such a
covenant is money damages.113 Alternatively, a seller can restrict the
use of the land by conveying a defeasible fee, such as a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to condition subsequent. The buyer
of such a fee stands to forfeit the land if he uses it in certain ways.114
Regardless of how the seller chooses to restrict the use of the land, it
is unlikely that anyone would argue that the buyer did not receive a
property interest in the land.115 The contract of sale116 and deed117 for
real property, however, convey not the things, the land and the building, but an estate in those things. The estate is itself an intangible
right, the property right.
The comparison between land in the tangible world and assets in
a virtual world illustrates the problems that people tend to have giving property attributes to assets that they consider abstract. The development of the Internet and the World Wide Web has animated the
discussion of intangible property rights, but intangible assets are not
creations of the Internet era. Most of us would consider our bank accounts to be our property notwithstanding the intangibility of the
bank account. Most of the known intangible assets before the advent
of the Internet fell into two categories, intellectual property rights
and payment rights. Both of these types of rights can be seen or otherwise sensed. An idea is not entitled to copyright protection until it
is fixed in a medium that can be perceived.118 Therefore, while the
idea of copyright is somewhat ephemeral, everyone understands the
nature of a literary or musical work. Likewise, payment rights are
intangible rights, but until recently, they tended to be evidenced by
Life, to suspend or terminate a members’ account at any time, without any monetary liability to the member. Id. at § 2.6.
111. See infra notes 124-49 and accompanying text.
112. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.13 (3d ed.
2000).
113. Id. at § 8.21.
114. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 772 (6th ed. 2006).
115. See Fairfield, supra note 107, at 1083-84 (“To state that such [contracts] presumptively knock out any emergent property rights is to beg the question: why should we permit
consensual agreements that prevent formation of property rights in the first instance any
more than we tolerate other restraints on alienation?”).
116. See Multiboard Residential Real Estate Contract 3.0, in DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra
note 114, at 454, 458 (“Seller shall convey . . . to Buyer . . . good and merchantable title to
the Real Estate . . . .”)
117. See General Warranty Deed, in DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 114, at 514 (“grantor . . . covenants . . . that he has a good right to convey the fee simple . . . .”).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
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paper items such as checks, dollar bills, and promissory notes. Because all of these intangible rights are associated with things, giving
the property label to them is not difficult.
As the thing in which rights are embodied declines in intrinsic
value, the distinction between the tangible thing and the intangible
right embodied in the tangible thing becomes less meaningful. Money
serves as an interesting illustration of the false distinction between
the tangible and the intangible. There is no inherent value of the
pieces of paper that represent money. Therefore, money has no value
at all unless people believe in money. Not only is American currency
no longer backed by gold, but today, an enormous number of payment transactions do not even involve the transfer of paper money.119
Credit and debit cards represent value, but are not themselves
money. Today, therefore, money is truly invisible, and we confer real
value on the idea of money.120 The evolution of money from stone
coins to gold-backed paper to paper not backed by gold to electronic
impulses previewed in some ways the evolution of personal property.
Whereas wealth had traditionally been represented by real estate
and other tangible items, it is increasingly represented by intangible
rights.121 In Secrets of the Temple, William Greider provides the following description of today’s money:
When money is no longer represented even by paper, it becomes a
pure abstraction, numbers filed somewhere in the memory of a distant computer. In the computer, it cannot be seen by anyone, neither its owner nor the bank clerk who does the accounting. At this
point, money has been reduced to nothing more tangible than electronic impulses, recorded on tape, which can be read or altered
only by other electronic impulses.122

Despite the fact that individuals commonly think of intangible
rights embodied in almost worthless tangible things as property, intangible rights unconnected to tangible things continue to confound
judges.123 Some judges seem to consider tangibility to be an essential
component of property in deciding cases involving rights to electronic
assets. By failing to look beyond the fact that the assets in question
119. See RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 3 (3d ed. 2006) (“[A]s of 2003, cash was used in only 41
percent of consumer payment transactions, accounting for only 21 percent of dollars
spent.”).
120. See WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE
RUNS THE COUNTRY 226-31 (1987).
121. Securitising Intellectual Property: Intangible Opportunities, ECONOMIST, June 17,
2006, at 33 (reporting on a study by Baruch Lev, a finance professor at New York University, estimating the value of intangible assets on American companies’ balance sheets at
about six trillion dollars).
122. GREIDER, supra note 120, at 230.
123. See infra notes 124-50 and accompanying text.
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were intangible, the courts deciding these cases made decisions that
have the potential to hinder the development of the property law
components of commercial law. The cases discussed below show that
despite the governing academic definition of property as the relationship among persons with respect to resources, the fact that a right is
not tangible sometimes throws the property label into question.
Two cases involving enforcement of judgments against Internet
domain names illustrate the courts’ discomfort with purely intangible rights. In both of these cases, Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro
International, Inc.124 and Dorer v. Arel,125 the courts ruled that an
Internet domain name is the “product of a contract for services between the registrar and registrant.”126
Both courts were bound and hindered by the Virginia garnishment statute. As discussed in Part II of this Article, garnishment
statutes tend to be outdated and many of them do not give creditors
the general ability to seize all intangible rights. In Virginia, only a
liability owed to the debtor can be garnished.127 Rather than holding
simply that a domain name is not the type of liability contemplated
by the statute or that the domain name registrar does have some
garnishable liability to the domain name registrant, both courts engaged in some unfortunate reasoning that illustrates the lack of an
adequate property vocabulary with which to describe intangible
property rights.
In Dorer, the court ultimately avoided ruling on whether the domain name registrant had property rights in its name by finding an
alternative method by which the plaintiff in a trademark infringement action could gain control over the infringing name. The plaintiff
wanted to use the debt collection mechanism, but the court questioned whether a domain name could be subject to a judgment lien
because only intangible personal property could be subject to a judgment lien.128 In the opinion, the Dorer court distinguished between
domain names that are trademarks and generic domain names,129
which are not eligible for trademark protection.130 The court found
clear property rights in trademarked names but questioned the property aspects of generic names, explaining that “a domain name that
is not a trademark arguably entails only contract, not property
rights.”131 One curious result of this reasoning, which the court itself
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000).
60 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D. Va. 1999).
Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 86 (quoting Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561).
VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-511 (2001).
Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 559.
Id. at 560-62.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2000).
Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (emphasis added).
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noted, is that a domain name that is a trademark has no exchange
value apart from the goodwill of the enterprise holding the trademark, while generic names often have great exchange value.132 The
court also noted, perhaps incorrectly, that a domain name has no
value without use by its registrant, and that a valueless domain
name could not be subject to a judgment lien.133
The dispute in Umbro arose out of a cybersquatting case, in which
a company, 3263851 Canada, registered a domain name containing
the Umbro trademark.134 Umbro won its cybersquatting case against
3263851 Canada, and was awarded injunctive relief and damages.135
Umbro attempted to enforce the damages award by garnishing 38 of
3263851 Canada’s domain names, which were generic names linked
to pornographic web sites.136 To initiate the garnishment, Umbro
named Network Solutions (NSI), the domain name registrar, as garnishee and requested that NSI place the domain names on hold and
deposit control of them into the court so that the names could be sold
at auction.137 NSI answered the summons by claiming that it held no
garnishable property belonging to the debtor.138 The Virginia Supreme Court agreed with NSI and held that Umbro could not garnish
the domain name.139 The governing statute provided that only a “liability” owing from a third party to a debtor could be the subject of a
garnishment proceeding.140
Like the court in Dorer, the court in Umbro placed great emphasis
on the fact that a domain name is created by a contract. The court’s
main basis for its holding was that a domain name, whether it is
property or not, is “the product of a contract for services,” and therefore not a garnishable liability.141
This holding is an excellent example of judicial discomfort with intangible rights. First, the court explained that a domain name cannot
exist without the supporting services of the domain name registrar.142
Second, the court expressed its fear that if it allowed garnishment of
a domain name, then all services could be garnished.143

132. Id. at 560-61.
133. Id. at 561.
134. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 81 (Va. 2000).
135. Id.
136. See Umbro Int’l, Inc. v. 3263851 Canada, Inc., 48 Va. Cir. 139, 140, 1999 WL
117760, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 1999), rev’d sub nom. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro
Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000).
137. Id.
138. 529 S.E.2d at 81.
139. Id. at 88.
140. Id. at 85.
141. Id. at 86.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 86-87.
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There are several problems with this reasoning. First, commercial
law recognizes many contract rights as property rights. As I explained in Part II, in order for a right to serve as collateral, the
debtor must have property rights in it.144 Three examples of contract
rights that are included in U.C.C. property are accounts receivable,145
deposit accounts146 and negotiable instruments.147 Earlier versions of
the U.C.C. included “contract rights” as a distinct category of collateral.148
Second, most intangible rights need the support services of a third
party in order to be usable. For instance, ING Direct, an Internet
bank, offers online bank accounts.149 Unless someone at ING maintains the records of these bank accounts, the holders cannot reach
the value of them. One need not use an Internet bank to make this
point. Even bank accounts at brick and mortar banks are intangible
rights, usable only because a third party, the bank, keeps a record of
their existence. The fact that a third party must be involved in most
intangible property rights is crucial to understanding electronic assets and crucial to developing a new method of classifying property
rights in the Internet age.
Had the court focused on the property attributes of a domain
name rather than its intangibility, it might have reached a different
result. In Umbro, the Virginia Supreme Court missed the opportunity to extend creditors’ remedies to intangible assets generally. In
doing so, the court looked to the wrong analogy, the service contract.
Decisions like those in Dorer and Umbro are potentially harmful
to the extension of existing commercial laws to electronic assets. One
way in which this decision is harmful is that it is sometimes cited for
the proposition that a domain name is “not property.”150 The “not
property” label can in turn take such an asset out of the pool of rights
144. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
145. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2005).
146. Id. § 9-102(a)(29).
147. Id. § 9-102(a)(47). A negotiable instrument is recognized as a contract. MILLER &
HARRELL, supra note 30, at ¶ 1.03.
148. 1 GILMORE, supra note 89, at 150.
149. ING Direct, http://home.ingdirect.com/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
150. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc., v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 858 n.29 (E.D. Va.
2000) (describing Umbro as standing for the proposition that “a domain name is not a
‘thing’ with a particular location, as it does not ‘exist[] separate from [the] service that created it and that maintains its continued liability’ ”); Wornow v. Register.com, 778 N.Y.S.2d
25, 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (“We are in accord with authorities holding that a domain
name that is not trademarked or patented is not personal property, but rather a contract
right that cannot exist separate and apart from the services performed by a registrar . . .
.”); Warren E. Agin, The Internet Bankruptcy: What Happens When the Bell Tolls for the
eCommerce Industry?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 11 (2002) (describing Umbro as holding that
“while a domain name is an intangible asset, that asset is limited to [] contract rights”);
Chander, supra note 107, at 773-74 (describing Umbro as concluding “that a domain name
represents simply a service contract, not property subject to garnishment”).
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that can be used as collateral for a loan or distributed in a bankruptcy case. In addition, the Umbro court’s reluctance to extend the
law of garnishment to Internet domain names and intangible property generally is bad precedent. The failure to extend the garnishment remedy to intangible rights generally contributes to the balkanization of the laws governing creditors’ rights in intangible property, which is in turn undesirable because of the uncertainty and
lack of uniformity that it breeds.
B. “Intangible” as a Misleading Category
[T]he best way to learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors
is to study general rules. Lots of cases deal with sales of horses;
others deal with people kicked by horses . . . . Any effort to collect
these strands into a course on “The Law of the Horse” is doomed to
be shallow and to miss unifying principles.151

Judge Frank Easterbrook made these comments in 1996, in an article in which he analogized the subject of “property in cyberspace” to
“the law of the horse.”152 The discussions regarding intangible assets
in some scholarship as well as in case law seem to be leading to a
“law of the horse” for intangibles. The intangible nature of assets
such as Internet domain names seems to blind courts to general
property principles. Courts, by placing paramount importance on the
physical manifestation of assets, seem to forget to address other
property characteristics of those assets, such as whether and how
they can be transferred and whether the owner of the asset can exclude others from it. This focus on intangibility leads to two problems. First, courts and scholars sometimes speak as though the various types of intangible assets should be placed in a single category, a
tendency that causes courts to make broad statements about the application of legal principles to intangible assets. A second problem,
related to the first, is that courts and some scholars tend to give new
intangible rights the “intellectual property” label. Both of these tendencies have the potential to hinder the development of commercial
law in that they cause lawyers and courts to ignore well-tested property analogies, thus prompting them to call for new rules to govern
new assets.

151. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 207, 207.
152. Id. at 208. Judge Easterbrook has also criticized the impulse of scholars to reform
property law in response to the challenges posed by the Internet. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus Property Law?, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 103 (1999).
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1. “Intangible Property” as a Discrete Asset Class
The growth of the Internet has reinvigorated property scholarship. Scholars have analyzed the property classification of several
different types of electronic assets, including Internet domain names,
computer systems, and assets in virtual worlds. Some of these authors have classified these types of property in broad terms, such as
“cyberproperty”153 and “virtual property.”154 These classifications do
not raise problems so long as the rules that the authors propose are
limited to the specific types of rights on which they are focusing. For
instance, in her article Defending Cyberproperty, Patricia Bellia proposes a framework for the legal treatment of a network resource
owner’s attempts to prohibit unwanted access to his system.155 In
formulating this framework, she analyzes cases that she describes as
“cyberproperty cases,” all of which concern access to information in a
computer system. Rights in computer systems implicate special considerations such as freedom of speech and information; thus, in formulating those rights, one must take those competing interests into
account.156 Narrowly defining “cyberproperty” as including only those
rights gives appropriate guidance to lawmaking institutions.
On the other hand, other authors imply that “cyberproperty” is a
distinct asset type. Greg Lastowka, in Decoding Cyberproperty,157 expresses skepticism that digital code within a computer can or should
be analogized to a form of property.158 Yet while he begins with a critique of applying property rules to network resources, his article also
covers some of the cases dealing with Internet domain names, which,
while comprised of computer code, are substantively different from
information on a web site. Similarly, while Xuan-Thao Nguyen, in
Cyberproperty and Judicial Dissonance: The Trouble with Domain
Name Classification,159 focuses almost solely on Internet domain
names, she notes that some of the domain name cases failed to “adequately appraise the nature of cyberproperty in general,”160 as though
153. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 107 (discussing property rights in computer systems);
Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 146-53 (1998) (using “cyberproperty” to refer
to rights in information available on the Internet); R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457, 463 (2005) (using the term “cyberproperty” to describe the “appropriate entitlement regime for access to network-connected resources”).
154. See, e.g., F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2004) (using the term “virtual property” to describe “objects” in virtual
worlds); Kevin W. Saunders, Virtual Worlds—Real Courts, 52 VILL. L. REV. 187, 192, 22733 (2007) (using “virtual property” to describe assets in virtual worlds).
155. Bellia, supra note 107, at 2210-24.
156. Id. at 2194.
157. 40 IND. L. REV. 23 (2007).
158. Id. at 44.
159. 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183 (2001).
160. Id. at 185.
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“cyberproperty” were a class of property rights that share important
characteristics.
This overbroad classification of electronic assets is also evident in
case law. Some of the decisions discussing the applicability of the tort
of conversion to electronic assets display a tendency to classify intangible assets as a distinct category. While conversion cases are not
creditors’ rights cases, some of the issues that must be resolved in
the two categories of cases are similar. In both creditors’ rights and
conversion cases, courts must determine who has exclusive possession or control of an asset. A series of New York cases, culminating in
the New York Court of Appeals decision in Thyroff v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co.,161 illustrates why focusing almost solely on the
physical manifestation of an asset leads to decisions that do not give
much guidance in fashioning rules for novel electronic assets.
Thyroff involved conversion. Conversion is an action that originally applied when a person dispossessed another of tangible personal property. The Restatement defines conversion as “an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor
may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.”162 This action applied only to tangible goods because only tangible goods could be lost or found.163 The tort of conversion was eventually extended to cover stock certificates, promissory notes and other
intangible rights that are “merged in a document.”164 This merger
doctrine recognizes that some intangible rights are embodied in paper documents in such a way that transfer of the document effects
transfer of the right.165
The plaintiff in Thyroff alleged conversion of electronic data
stored on his computer. The plaintiff, Thyroff, had been an insurance
agent for Nationwide, and when Nationwide terminated the agency
relationship, it denied him access to Nationwide’s agency office automation system.166 By denying Thyroff access to the system, Nationwide denied Thyroff access to the information that he stored on the
system, effectively seizing the data from him.167
The Second Circuit began its analysis in Thyroff by asking
whether a conversion claim may apply to “electronic data.” The court
recognized the merger exception, but then suggested that it was “un161. (Thyroff II), 864 N.E.2d 1272 (N.Y. 2007).
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (1965).
163. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 90 (5th ed.
1984); Thyroff II, 864 N.E.2d at 1275.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242(2).
165. Id. § 242 cmt. a.
166. Thyroff II, 864 N.E.2d at 1273.
167. Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (Thyroff I), 460 F.3d 400, 403 (2d Cir. 2006).
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clear and unresolved” whether the merger exception applied to electronic data.168 The court then surveyed New York law, citing cases
dealing with a wide range of intangibles, including a plaintiff’s time,
an artist’s interest in a performance, and medical records.169 If one
views intangible property as a discrete category, as the Second Circuit did, the cases were split. If one focuses on the differences among
the types of assets involved, however, they are consistent.
One of the cases relied on in the Second Circuit’s opinion, Sporn v.
MCA Records,170 was cited for the rule that an action for conversion
“will not normally lie over intangible property.”171 Had the Thyroff
court focused on the facts of Sporn, especially the nature of the rights
alleged to have been converted, it might have been able to formulate
a rule governing conversion of various types of electronic data.
Sporn, a New York Court of Appeals case from 1983, addressed
whether a master phonograph recording of a song could be converted.
The defendant in Sporn had acquired the recording without the
plaintiff’s permission and used it to republish the song.172 The court
held that because the tangible recording had been misappropriated,
the cause of action was for conversion of the tangible recording, not of
the intangible intellectual property rights embodied in the recording.173 The recording at issue in Sporn was made in 1957, well
before the age of digital music that can be easily copied without any
change in quality. Therefore, what the defendant in Sporn had
taken—the recording—was not important solely because it was tangible, but because, as the master recording, it could be used to make
marketable copies of the song on it. Thus, the transfer of the master
recording was the transfer of the value of the intellectual property
embodied in the recording, and the recording, because it was tangible, could be converted. Without specifically mentioning the merger
doctrine, the court adopted it. The statement in Sporn on which Thyroff relied, that “an action for conversion will not normally lie, when
it involves intangible property,”174 was probably a reasonable statement at the time it was made for two reasons. First, in 1983, it was
likely that the known universe of intangible rights consisted primarily of payment rights, which were often embodied in a tangible medium, and intellectual property. Second, the intangible right to which
the court in Sporn was referring was the intellectual property right.
168.
Kremen
text.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 405. The court based this observation on the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). See infra notes 210-26 and accompanying
Thyroff I, 460 F.3d at 405-07.
448 N.E.2d 1324 (N.Y. 1983).
Thyroff I, 460 F.3d at 402 (quoting Sporn, 448 N.E.2d at 1325).
Sporn, 448 N.E.2d at 1325.
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1327.
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Today, however, it is unreasonable for courts to adopt that statement
when there are many types of intangible assets, such as domain
names, that are not shareable.
Another case cited in Thyroff is a trial court case, Shmueli v. Corcoran Group.175 The plaintiff in Shmueli, like the plaintiff in Thyroff,
alleged conversion of business records maintained on her computer.176 The opinion evidences an apparent desire on the part of the
court to establish parity between electronic and paper records, in a
way that appears similar to the approach taken in the electronic
transactions acts discussed in the introduction to this Article. The
bulk of the Shmueli opinion seems to merely focus on the difference
between tangible and intangible assets and at one point, the court
notes that a “virtual” record can become a “literal” record “by the
mere expedient of a printing key function.”177 At the end of its conversion discussion, however, the court states that the plaintiff protected the materials by an access code.178 Unfortunately, the opinion
appears to miss the significance of the access code. If the person with
the access code has dominion over the information, then someone
who wrongly appropriates that access code has likely committed conversion, as she has exercised dominion over the property of another.
Password protected electronic materials, like domain names, are not
shareable assets and therefore should be the proper subjects of a
conversion action.
Finding a lack of clarity in New York law, the Second Circuit certified the conversion question in Thyroff to the New York Court of
Appeals, which answered that electronic records can be the subject of
a conversion action.179 To support its holding, the Court of Appeals
stressed the value of intangible data in the modern economy, stating
that a “document stored on a computer hard drive has the same
value as a paper document kept in a file cabinet.”180 The court then
questioned whether there was any reason “in law or logic” why creation of a document on a computer should be treated any differently
from creation of a document with pen, ink and paper.181 While the
court correctly noted that ownership of stock in a corporation can be
transferred without the use of any paper, thus perhaps rendering superfluous the merger requirement for conversion, it failed to explain
why the data at issue in the case should be treated as analogous to

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
2007)
180.
181.

802 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
Id. at 873.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 877.
Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (Thyroff II), 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1278 (N.Y.
Id.
Id.
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corporate stock. In its concluding paragraph, the court held that
“electronic records that were stored on a computer and were indistinguishable from printed documents [are] subject to a claim of conversion in New York.”182
Had the Second Circuit focused on aspects of the electronic data
apart from the intangibility of the data, it might have been able to
rule on the conversion question without certifying the question to the
New York Court of Appeals. In its opinion, the Second Circuit explained that in New York there are several elements to a conversion
claim. To satisfy the first element, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant’s assumption of ownership or the right of ownership was
unauthorized.183 To satisfy the second element, the plaintiff must
show that the unauthorized exercise of ownership was over the plaintiff’s goods.184 A plaintiff satisfies the third element by showing that
the exercise of ownership was to the exclusion of the owner’s
rights.185 The court found that two of these elements were met, but
that it could not find the defendant liable for conversion if the action
did not extend to electronic data.186 As a result, it seems that what
the defendant did—assert ownership rights in assets that did not belong to it—was less important than the physical manifestation of the
asset that it took without authorization. Because the Second Circuit
focused on the physical nature of the asset, it looked to the New York
Court of Appeals to clarify the law.
Cyberproperty is not a discrete asset class, nor is it a term that
can be used to coherently describe a set of rights that persons have
with respect to electronic assets comprised of computer code. Two authors, David Nelmark187 and Joshua Fairfield,188 have recognized this
and have drawn an important line: the line between intangible intellectual property and other intangible property. Both Nelmark and
Fairfield explain that not all intangible rights are alike, and both define virtual property as intangible property that is exclusionary,189
that is, intangible property that can be possessed, or controlled, by
one person.190 Nonexclusionary, or nonrivalrous property must be in182. Id.
183. Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (Thyroff I), 460 F.3d 400, 403-04 (2d Cir.
2006)
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 405.
187. David Nelmark, Virtual Property: The Challenges of Regulating Intangible, Exclusionary Property Interests Such as Domain Names, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1
(2004).
188. Fairfield, supra note 107.
189. Nelmark, supra note 187, at 5.
190. Fairfield, supra note 107, at 1053-54. Fairfield defines “virtual property” as intangible property that is rivalrous, persistent and interconnected, and further describes it as
“code . . . designed to act more like land or chattel than ideas.” Id. at 1049.
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tangible, but not all intangible property is nonrivalrous. An Internet
domain name is an example of such property.
New York’s case law illustrates why focusing on “tangible” as a
category or on “electronic data” as a category is not very helpful.
Such focus areas confuse rather than clarify the law. In the intellectual property arena, intangibility has relevance primarily because
several individuals can “use” the intangible intellectual property at
the same time. But, as noted above, not all intangible rights are
shareable.
The distinction between property that is exclusionary and property that is not is a crucial one for judges to keep in mind, because
the distinction will prevent them from falling into the habit, which I
will illustrate below, of classifying all intangible rights that are not
payment rights as “intellectual” property. This habit is a harmful one
because it directs judges and lawmakers to look to intellectual property law rather than property law generally for rules to govern electronic assets.
2. Intangible Assets as Intellectual Property
We see the tendency to place new intangible rights into the category of intellectual property in case law and scholarship. In some respects, this tendency is understandable. Intellectual property is intangible, so if we are looking for a known category into which we can
place new intangible rights, intellectual property appears to be the
correct one. This is particularly true when applied to domain names,
as domain names can incorporate trademarks. In addition, courts
appear to create new intellectual property rights from time to time,191
thus expanding the already unclear definition of intellectual property.
The category of intellectual property is itself a misleading category. Intellectual property is an umbrella term used to describe a
number of ways in which the law protects ideas. The ideas themselves, however, are categorized according to functional lines and are
dissimilar in many ways. For instance, copyright law protects an author’s rights in her original works; trademark law protects a person’s
use of a word or mark to identify the goods or services that he provides. One important unifying concept in intellectual property law is
that the public domain deserves protection.192 Ideas that are traditionally protected as intellectual property are nonrivalrous, that is,
191. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 19 (2000) (explaining that numerus clausus, the principle that property rights exist in a limited number of forms, seems
weakest in the area of intellectual property).
192. For instance, the Copyright Act grants fair use rights. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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many people can use them at once, and it is difficult to exclude others
from the protected ideas. As a result, copyright law protects not only
the creator’s right to exploit her creation, by granting the creator
rights such as the publication and performance right, but also the
public’s right to use that creation through doctrines such as fair use
and first sale. Intellectual property laws also limit the “owner’s”
rights in a temporal way. There are statutory time limits on the duration of copyrights and patents, and a trademark is entitled to protection only so long as the mark is used in commerce.193 When someone wrongfully uses an idea protected by intellectual property laws,
the action is one for infringement, in which a court will enjoin the
wrongful user from using the protected idea.194 There is no mechanism for returning the idea to the author, because ideas are nonexclusionary.
A number of authors have placed domain names into the category
of intellectual property. For instance, authors who have written on
the classification of domain names for the purposes of secured transactions and bankruptcy have argued that their recommendations
would facilitate the use of “domain names along with other intellectual property as collateral.”195 In their article Taxing the New Intellectual Property Right,196 Xuan-Thao Nguyen and Jeffrey Maine consistently refer to the domain name as a “new form . . . of intellectual
property right,”197 a characterization announced in the title of their
article. Jacqueline Lipton asks in one article whether domain names
are “a form of intellectual property or [other] quasi property.”198
Simply labeling a domain name as intellectual property is not
harmful in itself; in fact, all of the above-mentioned authors focused
on rules governing domain names and not other types of electronic
193. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS § 1.2.4 (2003).
194. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.01 (Supp.
2006).
195. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Commercial Law Collides with Cyberspace: The Trouble
with Perfection—Insecurity Interests in the New Corporate Asset, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
37, 80 (2002) (emphasis added); see also Robert Brady et al., Determining and Preserving
the Assets of Dot-Coms, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 185, 194 (2003) (discussing the treatment of
“domain names and other intellectual property” in bankruptcy).
196. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual Property
Right, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2004).
197. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). These authors also characterize domain names as intellectual property in their book, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TAXATION: PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS 18 (2004). Professor Nguyen has made this reference in a number of other articles. See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Intellectual Property Financing: Security Interests in
Domain Names and Web Contents, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 489, 504 (2001) (concluding
that “[p]erfection of security interests in domain names and web contents is an important
process in intellectual property financing”).
198. Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Name Disputes Past
Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1361, 1366 (2005).
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assets in their articles. The problem, however, is that the more
courts and commentators reflexively give emerging intangible assets
the intellectual property label, the less likely it is that courts will
look beyond the category of intangible property in formulating their
rules for new forms of electronic assets.
This misclassification is evident in the case law. Umbro, discussed
above,199 dealt with a creditor’s rights in generic domain names. The
trial court held that Umbro could garnish the domain names. In its
decision, however, it fell into a common trap. Rather than simply
characterizing the domain names as “property” that could be subjected to garnishment, it characterized them as “intellectual property.”200 In doing so, the court cited to a patent case and to an article
about judgment creditors’ rights in intellectual property.201 Reasoning like this unnecessarily complicates a creditor’s enforcement of its
rights in an intangible asset. As I will explain in the next Part of this
Article, our law has long substituted constructive possession for
manual possession when an asset cannot be easily manually possessed. Had the court characterized the domain name as property,
lawyers relying on the decision could then find some way to take possession or control of it. By characterizing it as intellectual property,
however, the court directed lawyers to consult the far more complex
rules regarding enforcement of judgments in intellectual property
rights. As a result, the Virginia Supreme Court pointed out in Umbro
that intellectual property rights generally cannot be taken by creditors using procedures such as execution or seizure.202
As explained above, however, intellectual property rights are not
analogous to domain names in one significant respect: no one has exclusive control over a copyrighted work or trademark, while the domain name registrant has exclusive control over the use of its domain name. The domain name system was developed so that individuals could find web sites without being forced to remember the
numeric IP addresses of a large number of computers.203 When a person registers a domain name with a registrar such as Network Solutions, the registrar links the name to the IP address of the registrant’s computer.204 The name can be associated with only one IP address; if it could be associated with many, the domain name system
199. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
200. Umbro Int’l, Inc. v. 3263851 Canada, Inc., 48 Va. Cir. 139, 144, 1999 WL 117760,
at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 1999), rev’d sub nom. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc.,
529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000).
201. Id.
202. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86 n.13 (Va. 2000).
203. InterNIC, The Domain Name System: A Nontechnical Explanation—Why Universal
Resolvability
is
Important
[hereinafter
InterNIC
DNS
Explanation],
http://www.internic.net/faqs/authoritative-dns.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
204. Id.
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would not work.205 Therefore, by gaining control of the registration, a
person gains control over the valuable asset, the Internet domain
name. Thus, the treatment of domain names as intellectual property
can lead to a wrong result.
The court in Dorer v. Arel206 also made a logical misstep by automatically assuming that in order for the domain name at issue to be
protected as property, the domain name had to be intellectual property. As explained above, the Dorer court distinguished domain
names that are eligible for trademark protection from those that are
not. The court explained that holders of names in the former category
clearly have property rights in those names, but that domain names
that do not qualify for trademark protection arguably consist only of
contract, not property rights.207 By looking at intellectual property as
the default category for intangible property, the court made a statement that makes no sense from a market perspective. Generic names
can be freely bought and sold for large amounts of money, but names
that are trademarks cannot be sold without the goodwill of the business to which they are associated. From the creditors’ rights perspective, marketability is perhaps the most important aspect of a property right. The idea behind creditors’ remedies is to seize and sell an
asset in order to satisfy a debt. Therefore, while Article 9 of the
U.C.C. defines collateral in property terms, any right that a debtor
can exchange for money should be considered a property right for
commercial law purposes.
In formulating their rules to govern electronic assets, courts are
looking to the wrong analogy. By analogizing electronic assets only to
other forms of intangible assets, courts are missing basic property
law principles that are unrelated to the physical manifestation of assets. In the next Part, I will discuss another mistaken analogy, the
perfect analogy to the tangible that some lawmaking bodies want to
find.
C. If It’s Intangible, Can We Make It Look Tangible?
Thinking about the Internet by reference to the physical world is
fine, if for no other reason than that courts must apply a host of
physical-world laws to the Internet. But blind application of the
metaphor to reach a particular result obscures more than it illumines.208

Mark Lemley, who wrote the above statement, and other scholars
have questioned the tendency of courts to analogize cyberspace to a
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
60 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D. Va. 1999).
See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 542 (2003).
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place. Much of the criticism in these “cyberspace as place” articles
centered on the extent to which property metaphors led to an undesirable privatization of information.209 In this Part, I will discuss a related analogy, the “electronic asset as thing” analogy. While it is only
natural to compare new rights to known rights, a perfect analogy to
the tangible is almost nonsensical where electronic assets are concerned. The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Kremen v. Cohen210 illustrates this problem, as do the rules in Article 9 of the U.C.C. applicable to control of electronic chattel paper. The slavish adherence to the
tangible right as the prototypical property right is not only inaccurate, but also harmful to the development of rules governing electronic assets. This is so because the perfect analogies that I describe
in this Part are too specific to be applied to new electronic assets as
they emerge, potentially leading to wasteful litigation.
The electronic asset at issue in Kremen was the sex.com domain
name, said to be the most valuable domain name up to that time.211
The facts of Kremen are truly astonishing. In 1994, Gary Kremen
registered sex.com to his business, Online Classifieds.212 Stephen
Cohen, a con man who had spent time in prison for impersonating a
bankruptcy lawyer, tricked Network Solutions into transferring
sex.com to him. He did so by sending Network Solutions a letter that
he claimed to have received from Online Classifieds.213 The letter
claimed that the company had fired Kremen and that it was abandoning the sex.com domain name.214 The letter also purported to authorize Cohen to use the name.215 On the basis of this paper letter,
sent through Cohen because the “author,” Online Classifieds, claimed
to have no Internet connection, Network Solutions transferred the
name to Cohen.216
Kremen sued Cohen, and the court ordered Cohen to return
sex.com to Kremen.217 The court also awarded Kremen $65 million in
damages.218 Kremen was unable to collect anything from Cohen because Cohen had removed his assets and himself from the country.219

209. Id.; see also Hunter, supra note 105, at 442 (explaining that “the Cyberspace As
Place metaphor leads to undesirable private control of the previously commons-like Internet”).
210. 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003).
211. In early 2006, the domain name sex.com sold for about $12,000,000. Sex.com Is
Said to Be Sold for About $12 Million to Escom, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at C9.
212. 337 F.3d at 1026.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1027.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.

152

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:119

Unable to collect from Cohen, Kremen turned to Network Solutions, bringing an action for conversion of the domain name.220 The
District Court held for Network Solutions, noting the “imprudence of
superimposing the archaic principles governing the tort of conversion
onto the nebulous realm of the Internet.”221 The Ninth Circuit reversed, relying in part on the Restatement of Torts, which, as explained above, allows an action for conversion when someone prevents the exercise of intangible rights that are merged in a document.222
In his Kremen opinion, Judge Kozinski wanted to treat electronic
and tangible assets as equivalents for the purpose of a conversion action. In holding that Network Solutions could be liable for the conversion of the sex.com domain name, he stressed that “there is nothing unfair about holding a company responsible for giving away
someone else’s property . . . .”223 Yet in finding that a domain name
registrant can bring an action for the conversion of a domain name,
the court engaged in mental gymnastics that rendered its holding
applicable to domain names only and not to other electronic assets.
The court recognized that the law of conversion had developed to
provide that some types of intangible rights could be the subject of a
conversion action and pointed to the merger doctrine.224 As explained
above, this provision applies to rights traditionally transferred by
negotiation, such as payment rights (promissory notes) and investment securities.225 Because the economic value of such rights was
typically transferred by negotiation, that is, by manually transferring the paper, converting the paper in which the right was embodied
could constitute conversion of the right itself. When applied to negotiable instruments and shares of paper stock, the rule that intangible
rights that are merged in a document can be the subject of a conversion action makes sense. The court was unwilling to discard the
merger requirement, first stating that California retains a “vestigial
merger requirement,” but then noting that the fact that data is
“stored in electronic form rather than on ink and paper is immaterial.”226
While the court in Kremen was sympathetic to the plight of owners of valuable intangible assets, it was unwilling to extend the tort
of conversion to all intangible rights. As a result, the Ninth Circuit
220. Id.
221. Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part by Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003).
222. Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030-31.
223. 337 F.3d at 1035.
224. Id. at 1031.
225. See notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
226. 337 F.3d at 1033-34.
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curiously found that an Internet domain name is merged in a document, the domain name system (DNS).227
What is curious about this holding is that the DNS itself is not
only intangible, but distributed among a number of places.228 The role
of the DNS is to help Internet users find specific web sites and e-mail
addresses. These web sites and e-mail addresses, in turn, must be
associated with a unique Internet Protocol, or IP number. By registering a name with a registrar such as Network Solutions, a domain
name registrant ensures that her chosen name is associated with her
computer’s IP address.229
The main flaw in this decision is the attempt to make a perfect
analogy to the tangible in a scenario in which tangibility plays no
role. Tangibility is relevant to the law of negotiable instruments because the value represented by those instruments has long been conveyed by the transfer of physical possession of a piece of paper. In the
world of Internet domain names, however, tangibility plays no role.
The court appears to have missed the significance of the merger requirement. The merger requirement recognizes that exclusive control
of some intangible rights is achieved by possession of a paper certificate. Therefore, the paper document should be less important as evidence of tangibility than as a vehicle for control. The court correctly
refused to extend the tort of conversion to all intangible rights because not every intangible right is susceptible to exclusive control.
The reason that the court was correct has nothing to do with any vestigial merger requirement. The DNS is important not because it
looks like paper, but because it establishes a mechanism through
which only one person can control the use of a domain name. The
DNS itself is not even the appropriate analogy to the paper document. To convert a domain name, one does not “seize” the DNS in
any way. One does exactly what Stephen Cohen did—notify the registrar that a new person is the owner of the registered name. The appropriate analogy would be to Network Solutions’ records, which are
also intangible.230
Judge Kozinski wanted to establish parity between tangible and
intangible assets. By focusing only on the physical manifestation of
227. Id.
228. The domain name system is comprised of 13 “root servers,” all containing the
same information: the Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses of all of the top-level domain
name registries, such as .com, .org and .net. Joining the root servers in the system are
thousands of computers, known as “resolvers,” all containing information cached from the
root servers. For a more detailed explanation of the DNS, see InterNIC DNS Explanation,
supra note 203.
229. See id.
230. Domain name registration is completely electronic. See, e.g., NetworkSolutions,
Domain
Name
Registration,
http://www.networksolutions.com/domain-nameregistration/index.jsp (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
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the domain name, however, he lost sight of some of the other qualities that render a domain name similar to assets that traditionally
could be converted. Like tangible assets, a domain name is rivalrous.
By causing Network Solutions to change the registration for sex.com,
Cohen had effected transfer of the value of the name to the exclusion
of the rightful owner, Kremen. Retaining the merger requirement,
albeit in a diluted form, keeps the focus on tangibility and not on
other important property qualities.
The court in Kremen stopped short of paving the way for a coherent approach to electronic assets. The message that the court sent is
that intangible property can be converted only if one can find some
document, in tangible or intangible form, to which it is related. The
court might have done a better job contributing to the law of electronic assets by concentrating on the classic components of property
rather than the distinction between tangible and intangible property.
An illogical attachment to the tangible can be found in even the
most recent revisions of commercial statutes. One of the most glaring
examples is Article 9’s definition of “control” over electronic chattel
paper.231 Chattel paper, which is defined as a “set of records evidencing both a payment obligation and a security interest in or lease of
goods,”232 is another example of an intangible set of rights that was
traditionally reified in paper. As a result, the transfer of those rights,
the payment right and the property interest, is effectuated by the
transfer of the paper. The laws governing chattel paper recognized
this fact, and Article 9 of the U.C.C. recognizes the significance of the
paper in its priority provisions. The usual rule in Article 9 is that the
first secured creditor to file a financing statement against or perfect
its interest in collateral has “priority in the proceeds of that collateral,”233 but Article 9 provides different, nontemporal priority rules
when the collateral consists of intangible rights traditionally reified
in paper and thus conveyed by a transfer of paper. Tangible chattel
paper falls into that category, so under Article 9, a creditor or purchaser who takes physical possession of the paper takes priority over
all other security interests in that paper, even if another creditor had
filed a financing statement before the possessing creditor took possession.234 This rule, which also applies to creditors who take negotiable instruments as collateral,235 recognizes business realities.
In the 1990s, the drafters of Article 9 decided to provide for a new
type of collateral, electronic chattel paper. Providing for this type of
collateral in Article 9 was certainly in the spirit of facilitating the ex231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

U.C.C. § 9-105 (2005).
Id. § 9-102(a)(11).
Id. § 9-322.
Id. § 9-330.
Id.
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pansion of commercial practices, a policy stated in Article 1,236 but
there was not yet a business practice involving electronic chattel paper on which to base the Article 9 rules. The drafters of both Article 9
and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act recognized that electronic assets such as electronic chattel paper would probably come
into existence, so they wrote provisions governing the transfer of
these not-yet-existent assets.237
Analogizing electronic chattel paper to tangible chattel paper, the
drafters granted those in control of electronic chattel paper priority
over those creditors who merely perfect their security interests by filing a financing statement. If electronic chattel paper will be used in
commerce the same way that tangible chattel paper is used, this basic concept is fine. “Control” first appeared in the U.C.C. with the
1994 revision of Article 8, which governs investment securities. The
drafters of Article 8 were forced to recognize the realities of the securities markets, in which millions of securities are transferred every
day. To incorporate existing business practices, the drafters of Article
8 developed a definition of control designed to be flexible enough to
encompass different methods of holding and transferring securities.238 An Official Comment to Article 8 of the U.C.C. clarifies the
control concept by emphasizing the purpose that control serves, explaining that “[o]btaining control means that the purchaser has
taken whatever steps are necessary, given the manner in which securities are held, to place itself in a position where it can have securities sold without further action by the owner.”239 In Article 8, “control” is an umbrella term that applies to certificated, or tangible, and
uncertificated, or intangible, securities, replacing but encompassing
“possession.”240
In Article 9, however, the drafters chose to define control of electronic chattel paper by analogizing control to manual possession,
granting the creditor control if the creditor has control over the “single authoritative copy” of the electronic chattel paper.241 The “single
authoritative copy” must be unique, identifiable, and unalterable.242
In the tangible world, the single authoritative copy is the original,

236. Id. § 1-103.
237. Id. § 9-105 (defining control of electronic chattel paper); UNIF. ELEC.
TRANSACTIONS ACT §16, 7A U.L.A. 211 (2002) (defining control of promissory notes and
documents of title).
238. U.C.C. § 8-106. The revision of Article 8 and the different methods of holding and
transferring securities are explained in detail in Schroeder, supra note 80.
239. U.C.C. § 8-106 cmt. 1.
240. See id. § 8-106.
241. Id. § 9-105.
242. Id.
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marked as such.243 In the intangible world, however, no such thing
exists, because computers can make perfect copies of electronic information.244 It would be unreasonable to require that the computer
code making up the electronic chattel paper be unique, unalterable,
and identifiable. An American Bar Association committee charged
with giving guidance for compliance with the electronic chattel paper
provisions pointed out that requiring code to be unique “would be
tantamount to requiring that the molecules making up the paper and
ink dots must be unique, identifiable and unalterable.”245
The drafters of Article 9 wanted the market for electronic chattel
paper systems to develop, and intended for their rules to facilitate
such development.246 By narrowly defining “control” in terms of an
analogy to the tangible that does not make sense, however, they may
have delayed the use of electronic chattel paper in commerce. The
term “control” without further definition might have sufficed, but
then it would have been up to the market, and to courts, to determine when a party had control over the electronic asset. The drafters
were in a bad position; as I have attempted to illustrate in this Part,
courts have difficulty dealing with possessory rights in electronic assets.
The problems illustrated in this Part arise from our tendency to
view the electronic assets of the Internet age as truly novel assets to
which modern rules must apply. As a result, when courts look for
rules to govern these assets, they tend to look only to rules governing
other intangible assets and not to those governing property generally. When courts and other lawmaking bodies decide that intangible
assets can be treated like tangible assets, they attempt to draw a
perfect analogy, which often does not make sense. As I will discuss in
the next section, however, courts have been adapting the concept of
possession to novel assets and transactions for centuries.
IV. THE HISTORICAL ROLES OF POSSESSION AND TANGIBILITY
Absent from the judicial opinions discussed in Part III of this Article is any analysis of traditional property principles. The law of
creditors’ remedies is property law; in order for a creditor to have
rights in a debtor’s asset, the debtor himself must have a property
right in that asset. The creditor must be able to transfer it to a third
243. Mattias Hallendorff & Mike Jerbic, Framework for Control over Electronic Chattel
Paper—Compliance with UCC § 1-105, 61 BUS. LAW 721, 724 (2006) (published as a product of the Working Group on Transferability of Electronic Assets, a Joint Working Group of
the Committee on Cyberspace Law and the Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code of
the ABA Section of Business Law, The Open Group Security Forum).
244. Id. at 725.
245. Id. at 739.
246. U.C.C. § 9-105 cmt. 4.
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party in order to realize the value of that asset. In this Part, I will illustrate that the application of those principles is not governed by
the tangibility or intangibility of assets and that courts and other
lawmaking bodies will make better decisions about emerging electronic assets if they look not to cases and other authority addressing
rights in other intangible assets, but to the whole range of property
cases that analyze the problem of obtaining possession or control
over assets, tangible and intangible, that cannot easily be grabbed.
The concept of possession has a long history as a centerpiece of
property law. Possession is said to establish first ownership of a
right,247 a concept applied to rights over assets in the wild, such as
animals248 and natural resources.249 Possession can also signal lesser
rights in assets, such as security interests.250 The transfer of possession is a significant event, as it signifies the transfer of value. This
concept is embodied in fraudulent transfer laws, which allow courts
to unravel transfers of assets that are not accompanied by the transfer of possession or control.251 Possession is also a critical component
of the law of gifts, and it is often said that if an item can be manually
transferred, it must be manually transferred so that the donor feels
“[t]he wrench of delivery.”252 For the purpose of this Article, it is necessary to identify why possession is an important component of creditors’ remedies and from there decide the acts that should constitute
possession.
The U.C.C. does not define “possession.” In National Safe Deposit
Co. v. Stead, the Supreme Court noted that “both in common speech
and in legal terminology, there is no word more ambiguous in its
meaning than possession.”253 Because there is no definition of possession in the U.C.C., it is necessary to define the term in the context of
the purposes that possession serves. Within Article 9, possession
serves two main purposes. The first purpose is the notice function.
For instance, a creditor can perfect its security interest under Article
247. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV.
1221 (1979); Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73
(1985).
248. See Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1805).
249. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889); see
generally Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture: An Oil and Gas
Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899 (2005).
250. U.C.C. § 9-313.
251. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(b), 7A U.L.A. 2 (2006).
252. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 114, at 157; Philip Mechem, The Requirement
of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 348 (1926). The Restatement recognizes symbolic delivery for all
types of personal property, whether or not the property is capable of manual delivery.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 (2003). This
point shows that in property, tangibility has little importance.
253. 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914).
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9 by taking possession of collateral.254 The purpose of perfection is to
give notice to the whole world that someone other than the debtor
may have a property interest in the collateral.255 The effectiveness of
possession as notice in this context has been analyzed by many.256
For the purpose of Article 9 remedies, possession serves a control
function. A creditor who repossesses a tangible asset then has the
right to sell that asset to satisfy the debt secured by that asset. In
order for the creditor to realize the value of the asset, therefore, there
must be some method by which the creditor can obtain the ability to
transfer it. For certain intangible assets, as explained in Part II of
this Article, the creditor can collect the asset by notifying the person
obligated on the asset, or payment right, to make payment to the
creditor.
This control function of possession is inextricably linked to the notice function. According to Carol Rose, possession can be equated
with some kind of statement.257 In the world of tangible assets, we
assume that the person in manual possession can transfer the value
of the asset.258 This common assumption supports some of the justifications for the notice function of possession. If the world knows the
identity of the possessor and therefore the owner, transaction costs
will be reduced and the asset in question will be more easily transferable.259 Clear notice also reduces ambiguity and thereby minimizes
disputes.260 The notice function therefore facilitates the control function by telling the world the identity of the person with the ability to
transfer the value of the asset in question. Viewing the purposes of
possession enables us to determine the acts necessary to constitute
possession under the remedies provisions of Article 9 of the U.C.C.
and state judgment collection statutes.
While in Article 9 of the U.C.C. the term “possession” appears to
be equated with manual possession,261 possession in property law has
not historically been so confined. The casebook cases involving the
acquisition of title by capture are replete with language that is relevant in today’s disputes over electronic assets. Many first-year prop-

254. U.C.C. § 9-313.
255. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 16, at § 22-8.
256. See supra note 6.
257. Rose, supra note 247, at 77-79 (discussing the rules of adverse possession, under
which, in order to obtain title to land by adverse possession, an adverse possessor must
possess land in an open and notorious manner so that the true owner is put on notice to
protect his rights).
258. This assumption is codified in several places in the U.C.C. For instance, certain
bailees to whom goods are entrusted have the power to transfer good title to those goods to
good faith purchasers for value. U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
259. Rose, supra note 247, at 81.
260. Id. at 81-82.
261. U.C.C. § 9-105.
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erty casebooks devote a large part of their beginning coverage to the
concept of possession.262 While the assets in question in the casebook
coverage tend to be tangible, the concepts relating to the control of
those assets need not be limited to physical property that can be
picked up and moved around.
Two well-known cases involving the capture of wild animals, Pierson v. Post263 and Ghen v. Rich,264 illustrate the two functions of possession that are important to creditors’ remedies. Whether the asset
in question is tangible, however, is irrelevant to the concept of capture, a point that is clear even in these cases. The definitions of possession in these opinions are noteworthy for several reasons. First, in
neither case is an actual manual taking necessary—in fact, in either
case such an act would have been nearly impossible. This is a point
that has particular resonance in the world of electronic assets because it is of course impossible to manually grasp such assets. The
impossibility of grasping such assets is not, however, necessarily related to the lack of a tangible manifestation of the asset.
Both the control and notice functions of possession are evident in
Pierson. From that case, we learn that mortal wounding combined
with continued pursuit constitutes control sufficient to allow the person asserting such control to maintain an action for the deprivation
of that control. The control function seems obvious from the opinion,
as the court holds that acts that deprive the wild animal of its natural liberty, rendering escape impossible, are sufficient to constitute
possession for the purpose of establishing property rights.265 This
conception of possession recognizes that anyone who deprives a wild
animal of its natural liberty can then appropriate the animal to his
own use and then presumably transfer the value of that animal. As
Carol Rose points out,266 however, the Pierson opinion also supports
the notice function of possession by requiring an act that “manifests
an unequivocal intention of appropriating the animal to his individual use.”267 Depriving an asset of its natural liberty does not, however, necessarily mean taking the asset in one’s hands.
From Ghen v. Rich,268 we learn that first possession need not even
be by an act that deprives an asset of its liberty. In Ghen, the wild
asset involved was a whale, and the dispute was between the person
who killed the whale and the person who found the whale on the
262. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 114, at 17-172; THOMAS W. MERRILL &
HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 81-242 (2007); GRANT S. NELSON ET
AL., CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 30-124 (2d ed. 2002).
263. 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
264. 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881).
265. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 178.
266. See Rose, supra note 247, at 76.
267. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 178 (emphasis added).
268. 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881).
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beach and appropriated it to his own use.269 In a sense, killing did not
deprive the whale of its natural liberty, because once the whale was
shot with a bomb lance, it would sink to the bottom of the ocean and
then several days later would float to the surface.270 As a result, a
person other than the person who killed the whale could easily take
it, which is what occurred, thus triggering the lawsuit.
The court in Ghen looked to the customs in the whaling industry
in Provincetown and found that according to industry usage, the person who killed the whale in the same manner as the plaintiff established an ownership right in the whale.271 Not all industry usages
would pass muster under the court’s reasoning, but the custom established in Ghen required the “only act of appropriation that [was]
possible in the nature of the case.”272 This reasoning should not be
limited to tangible assets, however. It should apply to all assets that
are not susceptible of manual possession.
When intangible rights are involved, the people involved in the
relevant business will necessarily define the acts that constitute possession. This is already the case in the domain name business; the
person who can transfer the asset is the person whose name is in the
registrar’s records.273 Participants in the businesses that use electronic chattel paper are also defining control of that asset.274 While
some have criticized the practice of defining possession by custom,
they do so primarily because custom does not give notice to the entire
world of the claimant’s possession.275 This criticism has relevance
when we look to first possession as a method of establishing title, but
when we are talking about creditors’ remedies against electronic assets, the title has already been established by contract. In the remedies and repossession context, however, it is probably not necessary
to give the entire world notice of a change in control of the asset. As
is currently the case in the real estate business, where recording is
deemed to give notice to the whole world of the ownership of real
property, systems for recording the transfer of ownership of electronic assets will likely be developed.
Gift cases from the early twentieth century also illustrate that the
corporeal manifestation of an asset does not have great importance
in property law. In a series of law review articles published in 1926
and 1927, Philip Mechem discussed the delivery requirement as ap269. Id. at 160.
270. Id. at 159.
271. Id. at 160.
272. Id. at 162.
273. See, e.g., Network Solutions, Service Agreement Version 7.8, Schedule J to Service
Agreement, http://www.networksolutions.com/legal/static-service-agreement.jsp#rnca (last
visited Nov. 1, 2007).
274. See generally Hallendorff & Jerbic, supra note 243.
275. Epstein, supra note 247, at 1231; Rose, supra note 247, at 85.

2007]

FALSE CATEGORIES IN COMMERCIAL LAW

161

plied to gifts of chattels.276 Many of the points that Mechem made in
those articles are as relevant today with respect to electronic assets
as they were in the 1920s with respect to gifts of tangible assets. For
instance, he notes that it is nearly impossible, and perhaps not very
helpful, to define the term “delivery.”277 The concept of delivery, as
applied to gifts, would seem to be inextricably related to the concept
of possession, but as Mechem illustrated in his three articles, courts
did not uniformly apply a delivery requirement that mandated a
manual transfer of physical possession (“manual tradition” in his
parlance). In proposing a coherent approach to delivery and possession, he identified manual tradition as the preferred method of delivery sufficient to complete a gift and then defined adequate delivery
short of manual tradition in terms of the functions that manual tradition serves.278
Courts have been called upon to opine on the validity of gifts in
the absence of manual delivery for hundreds of years. These cases do
not necessarily turn on the tangible or intangible nature of the right
given; rather, they turn on the means of control or on indicia of ownership. In the 1920s Mechem recognized that a gift of a thing is not a
transfer of the thing, but that the gift is a transfer of rights in the
thing.279 This view is in accordance with the commonly understood
definition of property as the relationships among persons with respect to things or resources.280 At the beginning of the twentieth century, questions regarding delivery of gifts arose in several contexts
including gifts of choses in action and gifts of chattels that could not
be easily manually possessed.
The analysis in the first category of cases recognized the fact that
some intangible rights were reified in paper such that delivery of the
paper constituted delivery of the right.281 Courts then began to recognize that choses in action that were not reified could also be transferred as gifts, but there was disagreement on the method of transfer
of those types of rights. In some cases, the courts held that delivery
276. Mechem, supra note 252; Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of
Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 457
(1927) [hereinafter Mechem, Delivery II]; Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in
Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L.
REV. 568 (1927).
277. Mechem, supra note 252, at 342.
278. Id. at 354. Mechem lists three functions of the delivery requirement: “(a) make[]
vivid and clear to the donor the act he is doing, (b) make[] unequivocal to contemporary
witnesses, if any, the nature of the act done, and (c) give[] to the donee, subsequently to the
alleged gift, something which may serve as at least presumptive evidence of the truth of
his claim.” Id.
279. Id. at 346.
280. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
281. Adams v. Merced Stone Co., 178 P. 498, 500 (Cal. 1917); Ogdon v. Washington
Nat’l Bank, 145 N.E. 514, 516 (Ind. App. 1924).
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of such an intangible right could only be effected by a written instrument;282 in others, the courts dispensed with the writing requirement, finding a valid delivery when there were sufficient facts
to show not only the intention of the donor to make the gift but also
the acceptance by the donee.283 In the latter group of cases, courts
were careful to recognize the evidentiary nature of the delivery requirement and stressed that when the intentions of the parties are
clear, such intentions should not be thwarted by an arbitrary physical delivery requirement.284
Another group of cases discussed by Mechem dealt with gifts of
livestock. Here, Mechem illustrated the courts’ reliance on business
practices in fashioning their delivery requirements. As a result, in a
case involving a gift of cattle to minor children, Coke & Reardon v.
Ikard,285 the court found sufficient delivery where donor branded the
cattle with separate marks and recorded those marks, as required by
statute, in the names of the donee children.286 In analyzing Coke &
Reardon, Mechem made several points that have been echoed by
modern commentators. The first is that where cattle and other livestock are involved, the concept of possession is somewhat illusory. In
his description of the spectrum of possession, he explains that when
a calf is being branded, it is probably in the possession of the person
wielding the branding iron, but once it is out on the range, it is in the
“possession” as the term is commonly understood, of no one.287
Another point that is worth noting about livestock cases is that in
some of them, a governing statute provided that title to livestock
transferred with sale of the mark, while in others,288 the courts simply noted that branding, being a method of permanent identification,
was practically the only way to evidence title.289 Accordingly, courts
and legislatures rendered the livestock fungible by recognizing that
ownership is a right and that the right of ownership can be transferred in any way practicable. As I will discuss below, the ability of
the American legal system to render assets fungible is recognized as
one of our system’s great triumphs.290
Just as today, courts deciding cases dealing with the nature of
electronic assets attempt to analogize them to tangible assets, yesterday’s courts tried to fashion concepts of delivery and possession to
fit cases in which those concepts were inapplicable. Other courts and
282.
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290.
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the commentators of the day noted the absurdity of trying to fit business practices that did not rely on physical possession into narrowly
defined categories of physical possession.291 Mechem described the
courts’ penchant for describing all sorts of acts as delivery as “an example of the judicial inclination to force anything and everything
into some existing pigeon hole.”292
In the creditors’ remedies context, possession is important to the
creditor’s ability to transfer the asset in question and thus realize the
value of it. Under the U.C.C. and other state creditors’ rights laws,
tangibility plays an important role in the transfer. Under traditional
property law, however, it is the law’s ability to transform the concrete into the abstract that facilitates transfer of assets. For instance,
property law does not speak of land as land, but rather of estates in
land. An estate in land, such as a leasehold, is an intangible right.
Courts have historically standardized estates so that these estates
could be more easily sold.293
Viewed in this light, our legal treatment of electronic assets is
paradoxical. While legal scholars and economists have long separated
the concept of property from individual items of property, today’s legal institutions tend to focus on the physical attributes of individual
items of property in developing rules to govern creditors’ rights in
electronic assets. As a result, our ability to transform a tangible asset
into an intangible right seems to have disappeared when the underlying asset is intangible.
One particularly good explanation of the importance of separating
the concepts of possession and control from that of tangibility is
found in Hernando de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital.294 In this book,
de Soto argues that capitalism is successful in the West but unsuccessful in developing countries because Western countries have a viable system of “[p]roperty representation [that] enable[s] people to
think about assets not only through physical acquaintance but also
through the description of their latent economic and social qualities.”295 As an example of how countries such as the United States effectively represent the economic concept of property, de Soto uses the
land title system.
De Soto’s use of the land title system in the United States as the
paradigm representational system illustrates how our system has effectively converted tangible items into intangible concepts to facili-

291. Id.
292. Mechem, Delivery II, supra note 276, at 483.
293. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 114, at 185.
294. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).
295. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
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tate the transfer of the economic value of those items. He notes that
when a house is transferred, nothing physically changes hands.296
The contention that our system has transformed tangible items
into intangible concepts is only partially correct, however. Even in
the area of real estate transfer, American law retains a vestigial paper delivery requirement. When a house is transferred, people think
of the deed as being transferred. Indeed, the deed must be delivered
from the seller to the buyer in order for the transfer of title to take effect.297
De Soto also claims that successful Western property systems
prosper by making property “fungible.”298 We render items of property fungible by our representational system that places items (by
items I mean real and personal property) into standard categories.
These standard categories allow buyers and financiers to assess the
economic value of the assets in question.299 The foregoing is an accurate depiction of our current property scheme only to a point. To continue with the commercial law example, Article 9 of the U.C.C.
adopts a representational system to publicize security interests in all
types of assets, tangible and intangible.300 This representational system is the filing system. We generally do not have a representational
system for ownership of tangible personal property, because ownership of that type of property is commonly transferred by manual delivery.
The cases and commentary discussed in this Part show that generally, we have no problem viewing property as an abstraction when
tangible assets are involved. Strangely, when the asset itself is
somewhat abstract, we have difficulty viewing the rights in the asset
in the same abstract way. The cases discussed in Part III show this
tendency and the commentary discussed in Part III gives some of the
likely reasons for our inability to view intangible assets as assets to
which traditional property rules should apply,301 but as I have tried
to illustrate, the idea of tangibility as tangibility has no relevance to
property law.
V. CONCLUSION
Adapting laws made in an earlier time, when communications
were face-to-face and letters were written on paper and signed in ink,
to today’s transactions, which are increasingly electronic, can be a
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great challenge. In commercial law, such adaptation is necessary, because it would be senseless to revise the Uniform Commercial Code
every time a novel form of asset is developed. After all, the U.C.C.
was originally drafted in a flexible manner so that it could encompass modern transactions with some judicial interpretation.
In order for courts to adapt commercial law to transactions in
electronic assets, they should keep in mind general property principles. Courts have been refashioning concepts of possession for hundreds of years, and it is a small conceptual jump from determining
control over a wild fox to finding control over a domain name. The
failure to keep these general principles in mind will inevitably lead
to Judge Easterbrook’s “Law of the Horse,”302 a law that is not only
shallow, but one that is unable to adapt to new forms of assets as
they develop.

302. See Easterbrook, supra note 151, at 208.
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